Does Bankruptcy Affect My Employment Opportunities?

DOES BANKRUPTCY AFFECT MY EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES?

Published on November 1, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone

I am asked this question more and more these days.  In a market with fewer job opportunities and numerous applicants, no one wants to hurt their chances of getting a job.  So, can an employer legally discriminate against you if you have filed bankruptcy?  The answer differs depending on whether the employer is a private (non-government) or public (government) company. 

Not surprisingly, there are more restrictions placed on government employers.  Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states:

... a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person ... solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title ...

                                 See Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code

There are two important aspects of this Code Section.  First, the phrase “deny employment to” clearly prevents a government employer from refusing to hire an applicant because he or she has filed a bankruptcy case in the past.  More importantly, a governmental unit may not “terminate the employment” of a person that has previously filed for bankruptcy protection.
Private employers are very different.  Section 525(b), applicable to non-governmental employers states as follows:

(b) No private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt--

(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act;

(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case under this title or during the case but before the grant or denial of a discharge; or

(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.

Congress had originally considered including the same prohibitions for private employers as the Code includes for governmental employers.  See Bankruptcy Commission, S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-508 (1975)  However, that language was not included.  As a result, although private employers cannot “terminate the employment” of an individual that has filed a bankruptcy case, it does appear that they can deny an applicant a position based on a bankruptcy filing.

This situation was recently addressed by the Court of Appeals for the 11^th Circuit (serving FL, GA and AL).  In Myers v. Toojay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F. 3d 1278 (11^th Cir., 2011) (click here for a .pdf of the opinion) a job applicant was offered a position and given a two-day “on-the-job” evaluation.  During that two-day period, the employer conducted a background check and discovered the applicant’s bankruptcy filing.  The job offer was rescinded (although the employee was paid for the two days of “on-the-job” evaluation).  The Court examined the Code and determined that the employers actions were proper. 

It is important to note that both Section 525(a) and Section 525(b) include the language “solely because” in its prohibitions.  Thus, an employer, private or public, may be able to prohibit hiring, and in the case of governmental employers, terminate employees if there are reasons to discriminate other than the bankruptcy filing (An example might be a Chief Financial Officer who files a bankruptcy case.  A CFO’s position is to be responsible for the financial health of a company.  It may be inappropriate to allow that individual to hold such a trusted position) .

In summary, no employer can terminate your employment solely because you filed a bankruptcy case.  However, a private employer may choose not to hire you because you filed for bankruptcy protection.  Of course, that same employer could reach the same conclusion based on your bad credit alone.

Student Loans: Are the dischargeable?

Student Loans: Are they dischargeable?

Published on September 6, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone

It seems that every week or so, I get a question regarding student loan debt. So, I figured I would do my best to answer the question: are they dischargeable? The technical answer is “yes”, but the reality is that the discharge is rare.

History

Prior to 1998, if a student loan had been in repayment for seven (7) years, the debt was dischargeable. However, on October 7, 1998, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to make federally issued or guaranteed loans non-dischargeable unless the debtor could prove an “undue hardship.” Private student loans, however, remained eligible for discharge.

Today

On October 17, 2005, the Bankruptcy Code was amended again and substantially altered the student loan landscape. Now, not only were federally insured loans non-dischargeable unless a debtor could prove an “undue hardship” but now private loans follow the same rules. In fact, there is even concern that using a credit card to pay off a student loan could prevent discharge of that portion of the credit card debt.

The “Undue Hardship” Standard

The seminal case for determining whether a debtor can discharge student loans is In re:

• Brunner, 831 F.2d 395 (1982) (adopted by the 11^th Circuit in Hemar Inc. Corp of Am. V. Cox, 338 F.3d 1238 (11^th Cir. 2003)). Under Brunner the burden is placed on the debtor to prove each of the following:
• that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
• that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and
• that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loan.

 

Undue Hardship: The Minimal Standard of Living Factor

In determining whether the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living, the Court must examine the debtor and her spouse's earnings to evaluate the quality of the debtor's lifestyle. See id. at 509. Debtors cannot satisfy the test "merely because repayment would require some major personal or financial sacrifices." Elmore v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. (In re Elmore), 230 B.R. 22, 26 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999). Thus, the debtor must prove that she cannot afford the basic living necessities if forced to repay the loan. SeeIvory v. United States (In re Ivory), 269 B.R. 890, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001) Rutherford v. William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (In re Rutherford), 317 B.R. 865, 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004) (opining that the "minimal standard of living" relates to the smallest degree of income necessary to cover all expenses essential for daily existence).

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama identified six factors that it deemed necessary for a minimal standard of living in America, including shelter, basic utilities, food and personal hygiene products, vehicles and the costs associated with a vehicle, health insurance, and some source of recreation. Ivory v. United States (In re Ivory), 269 B.R. 890, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).

The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia utilized these factors in its analysis of a student loan dischargeability filing and prior to its analysis of the facts, added: "[T]he Court must apply its common sense knowledge gained from ordinary observations in daily life and general experience to determine whether Debtor's expenses are reasonable and necessary. If Debtor expends funds for items not necessary for the maintenance of a minimal standard of living or if Debtor expends too much for an item that is needed to maintain that minimal standard of living, then it is unlikely that, given Debtor's present circumstances, the first prong of the Brunner test is satisfied where such overpayment would permit Debtor to cover the expense of her student loan debt without sacrificing a minimal standard of living . . . ." Douglas v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Douglas), 366 B.R. 241, 253-54 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007

Undue Hardship: Additional Circumstances

The second prong of the Brunner test requires a debtor to prove that additional circumstances exist indicating that she cannot maintain a minimal standard of living for a significant portion of the repayment period if the loans are not discharged. A debtor must show "a total incapacity . . . in the future to pay [her] debts for reasons not within her control." In re Mallinckrodt, 274 B.R. 560, 566-67 (S.D. Fla. 2002)(quoting Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2001). Further, satisfaction of the second prong should be based on a "certainty of hopelessness." In re Douglas, 366 B.R. 241, 256 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) see also Downey v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Downey), 255 B.R. 72, 76-77 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000).

Undue Hardship: Good Faith Efforts

Under the third and final prong of the Brunner test, a debtor must act in good faith to repay the loan. The good faith analysis requires the Court to consider the debtor's efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, "the debtor may not willfully or negligently cause [her] own default, but rather [her] condition must result from 'factors beyond [her] reasonable control.'" In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993). Whether the debtor has made or attempted to make payments is not itself dispositive, but the Court should evaluate the debtor's conduct in the broader context of her entire financial picture. Nary v. Complete Source (In re Nary), 253 B.R. 752, 768 (N.D. Tex. 2000)

Conclusion

In a recent New York case, the Judge determined that a 64 year-old frugal woman who worked on an assembly line earning $11 per hour and had received a layoff notice was entitled to a discharge. Bene v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp (In re Bene), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2914. In reaching its conclusion, the Court took notice of the fact that the debtor had obtained the loan in 1981, had never completed her education (she left school to care for her sick parents), had completed a five (5) year Chapter 13 case in which she partially paid the student loan, owed $56,000 against an original loan amount of $17,000 and that even under the William D. Ford Program that attempts to assist with loan repayment, the debtor would need to pay the debt for an additional 25 years until she reached age 89 and had no prospects of income, other than social security.

Clearly, it is not easy to discharge student loans.

TAXES: Are they dischargeable in bankruptcy?

TAXES:  Are they dischargeable in bankruptcy?

Published on July 21, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone

Often, I am asked whether tax debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy.  The short answer, as almost always is the case, is, it depends.  In order to make a determination, we need to know whether we are talking about trust taxes or income taxes.

Trust taxes are those taxes collected on behalf of a another party.  The two most common examples are sales taxes and payroll withholding taxes.  When you pay for an item in the store, you pay sales tax at the cash register.  The business is collecting the tax from you and holding it in trust to pay the taxing authority. 

Withholding taxes are the taxes that an employer withholds from your paycheck. It is important to note that there are actually two components to ­­­payroll taxes.  There is the portion the employer withholds and an equal payment that is matched by the employer.  Only the portion withheld from the employee’s paycheck is a trust taxes.

The person responsible for paying the taxes and failing to do so is personally responsible for the debt.  In a very small business, this is typically the owners.  In a larger business, it can be the treasurer, CFO or someone with similar duties.

Trust taxes are unfortunately, never dischargeable.  Income taxes, however, can be.

Income taxes follow a very convoluted rule.  They must be taxes that became due more than three (3) years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, an actual tax return must have been filed more than two years prior to the filing of the petition, and they must have been assessed more than 240 days prior to the petition date.

The 3-year rule works as follows:  first, determine which tax year is at issue.  Second determine what date those taxes were due, including extensions.  Third, look at a calendar for the current date.  So, if the taxes were due for the 2008 tax year and no extensions were filed and it is July 21, 2012, the taxes would meet the 3-year rule.  To say it another way, as you sit there on July 21, 2012, those taxes were due on April 15, 2009 (2008 taxes are due in 2009) which is more than 3 years prior to the filing date.  However, if you asked the same question on April 14, 2012, those taxes did not meet the 3 year rule.  As you can imagine, filing an extension changes the due date and the calculation become that much more difficult.

Assuming the taxes meet the first prong of the test, we next turn to whether the return was filed more than two years ago.  Under old law, the IRS could file a return for you (known as a “substitution for return’) and you could calculate time using that date.  Under recent law, the debtor must have filed an actual return at least two years prior to the date of the bankruptcy petition.  If the tax return was never filed, the two year period never starts to run.  So, returning to the above example, if the debtor never filed the return, meeting the 3-year portion of the test doesn’t help, because the second prong can never be met.  But, what if the debtor filed his return on July 10, 2010?  Here he meets both the first and second prong of the test.  The return was due more than 3 years prior to the bankruptcy filing and an actual return was filed more than 2 years ago.

Finally, if both the 3-year and 2-year prongs are met, we next turn to whether the taxes were “assessed” more than 240 days prior to filing the petition.  “Assessed” is a term at the IRS meaning the date it is entered in their system.  It is not the date the tax return was filed.  The only way to truly determine the assessment date is to contact the IRS and obtain a tax transcript with that information.  Audits, challenges, offers in compromise and other actions can extend the date of assessment.

Finally, as a general rule, if the underlying tax is not dischargeable, then the associated penalties and interest are not dischargeable either,  However, this is only a basic rule.  Further, if a tax lien has been filed, a new layer of complexity is added, but that is for another day.

As you can see, these rules are complicated and not as easy to understand as one might hope.  If you have tax debt and want to try and discharge it, you should discuss the matter with a more experienced bankruptcy attorney that has familiarity with business and tax issues.

Divorce and Personal Bankruptcy

BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE: 

Which comes first?

Published on June 12, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone

Bankruptcy and divorce cases are often intermingled.  Whether it is the divorce process that leads to the bankruptcy or the bankruptcy filing that leads to divorce is irrelevant.  The fact remains, that we are contacted on a regular basis to address “Which comes first, the divorce or the bankruptcy case?”  The short answer, as almost always is the answer, is, it depends.

There are times when, after full disclosure and waiver of potential conflicts of interest, it makes sense for the parties to file Chapter 7 together before the divorce is completed (a joint Chapter 13 case which obligates the parties to make payments over a 3 or 5-year period is not practical if the parties plan to divorce).  These are typically the cases where the debt is preventing the divorce (i.e. neither party can afford to pay the debts but if they could both walk away from their obligations, the divorce could be fairly easily resolved).  In these cases, the parties and the attorneys must be sure that no conflict exists.  The bankruptcy attorney cannot address what is best for either individual.  In fact, if these concerns arise, the individuals need to seek independent counsel. 

Chapter 7 (liquidation) debtors are “means test” limited by income and family size (these limitations are adjusted by state and county).  If the parties are married, or sometimes just living together, their combined incomes may be used in the eligibility calculations.  This can prevent a married couple from qualifying for chapter 7.

However, after the divorce, certain obligations incurred during the divorce can be helpful.  Assume that the husband is obligated, after the divorce case is completed, to pay child support and alimony.  These obligations are legitimate deductions from income when examining Chapter 7 eligibility under the means test.  Thus, oddly, an individual with a higher income that would not qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy when he was married, could become eligible for Chapter 7 after the divorce because of his child support and alimony obligations.  Incurring these debts solely for the purpose of passing the means test is improper.  However, if these debts are likely to be incurred and are helpful in the long run, an individual might benefit from agreeing to these obligations.

Another issue that often arises in our office is the “joint debt” problem.  Let’s assume that the husband and wife are jointly indebted on the mortgage.  In the divorce decree, the Court could determine that the Husband is responsible for the mortgage payments.  While the Husband could file bankruptcy and eliminate his obligation to the bank, he would still be obligated to his ex-wife for the same debt (divorce related debts are no longer dischargeable in Chapter 7 cases).  Let me say that another way, if there is joint debt and you are obligated to pay it in the divorce decree, filing a bankruptcy case may not get rid of the debt.  Anytime there is joint debt, the situation becomes more complicated and an experienced bankruptcy attorney, familiar with divorce issues, should be consulted.

Finally, the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an automatic stay.  Although the stay does not prevent the parties from obtaining a divorce, it does prevent the division of assets.  Thus, as a practical matter, the bankruptcy stops the divorce and it may be necessary to obtain an order from the bankruptcy court before continuing with the divorce.

Divorce and personal bankruptcy can each be complicated, however the combination is almost certain to create a very complex matter. Because every situation is unique, the only way to accurately determine your options, opportunities and risks is to consult with an attorney who is experienced in complicated divorce and bankruptcy cases. The legal team at the Falcone Law Firm has extensive experience in divorce, bankruptcy and small business law. If you need answers, call 770-426-9359 to arrange for a consultation with an attorney.

Using Tax Debt To Pass The Means Test

Tax Debt May Help You To Pass The Bankruptcy Means Test

Published on June 16, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone

One of the most challenging aspects of the revised Bankruptcy Code (BAPCPA) was the addition of the Means Test (11 USC §707(b)). When it first came out, practitioners were extremely concerned. No one likes a mechanical test that can determine a client’s fate under the Bankruptcy Code. To this day, more than six (6) years after BAPCPA’s implementation, we still get calls from potential clients claiming they are not eligible for to file for protection under Chapter 7 because they "have too much income." Most of these prospects, and very likely many attorneys with whom they have consulted, have looked only at the median income test to determine eligibility. Instead, they should be looking to see whether the test applies at all.

The Means Test applies only to debtors whose debts are "primarily consumer debts." The term "consumer debt" is defined at 11 USC §101(8) as a debt "incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family or household purpose." This definition is crucial in determining whether the Means Test applies. Most debtor’s lawyers know to look for obvious business debts, some even inquire into the purpose of the credit card debt, but income taxes seem to be overlooked on a regular basis.

Although, at first glance, income taxes would seem to be "personal" and therefore "consumer debt", it is clear that they are not. The Sixth Circuit has examined this issued and concluded that income taxes are not consumer debt (at least for the purposes of determining whether the co-debtor stay applies to these types of debts). In re: Westberry, 215 F. 3d 589 (6th Cir, 2000).

In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated the following: "First, a tax debt is incurred differently from a consumer debt. . . .[Its] incurrence is not voluntary on the part of the taxpayer." The Court went on to note that a "consumer debt is incurred for personal or household purposes, as stated in the statute, while taxes are incurred for a public purpose." It would be hard to argue with this logic since, "The Supreme Court has long noted, in other contexts, the public purpose of the imposition of taxes. See, e.g. Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664, 22 L. Ed. 455 (1874) ("We have established . . . beyond civil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose.")" Finally, the Court noted that "taxes arise from the earning of money, while consumer debt results from its consumption. See Greene, 157 B.R. at 497, Harrison, 82 B.R. at 558, Pressimone, 39 B.R. at 244."

Thus, if a prospective client comes to your office, depressed that they have plenty of tax debt, explain that this may be a blessing in disguise and could help them pass the Means Test and qualify for Chapter 7 treatment.

Chapter 7 - Removing An Unsecured Lien

Chapter 7 Debtors Can Now Strip Off A Wholly Unsecured Lien

Published on June 14, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone

Last month the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a Chapter 7 debtor can strip off a wholly unsecured second lien. See In McNeal v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al, No. 11-11352 (11th Cir. May 11, 2012)

In Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), the Supreme Court had rejected a Chapter 7 debtor’s argument to allow for the “strip down” of an undersecured lien. “The vast majority of courts have concluded that Dewsnup’s reasoning for not permitting a “strip down” of an undersecured lien in chapter 7 applies likewise to a chapter 7 debtor’s attempt to “strip off” a wholly unsecured lien. Talbert v. City Mortgage Services 344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 2001); Laskin v. First National Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); In re Caliguri, 2010 WL 1027411 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010); In re Grano, 422 B.R. 401 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Arrieta, 2009 WL 1789576 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009). Contra, In re Lavelle, 2009 WL 4043089 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2009); Howard v. National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).”

In the McNeal case, the Chapter 7 debtor alleged that her home was worth less than the amount of the first mortgage. Debtor argued that § §506(a) and (d) required that the second mortgage, being wholly unsecured, should be determined to be void and the lien stripped off completely. Judge Bonapfel of the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, disagreed, and ruled that the reasoning of Dewsnup applied and that a wholly unsecured lien could not be “stripped off” in a Chapter 7 case. The district court then affirmed. The National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA) filed an amicus brief with the Court. The Eleventh Circuit then reversed the decison.

To determine whether such an allowed -- but wholly unsecured -- claim is voidable, we must then look to section 506(d), which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against a debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.” See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). Several courts have determined that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992) -- which concluded that a Chapter 7 debtor could not “strip down” a partially secured lien under section 506(d) -- also precludes a Chapter 7 debtor from “stripping off” a wholly unsecured junior lien such as the lien at issue in this appeal. See, e.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 2001); Talbert v. City Mortgage Services., 344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003); Laskin v. First National Bank of Keystone, 222 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). But the present controlling precedent in the Eleventh Circuit remains our decision in Folendore v. United States Small Business Administration, 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). In Folendore, we concluded that an allowed claim that was wholly unsecured -- just as GMAC’s claim is here -- was voidable under the plain language of section 506(d). 862 F.2d at 1538-39.

The Court then explained although several Courts had treated Folendore as having been abrogated by Dewsnup, departure from a prior panel’s ruling was only appropriate only when an intervening Supreme Court decision is “clearly on point.”

Although the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup seems to reject the plain language analysis that we used in Folendore, “‘[t]here is, of course, an important difference between the holding in a case and the reasoning that supports that holding.’” Atlanta Sounding Co., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1284 (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1590 (1998)). “[T]hat the reasoning of an intervening high court decision is at odds with that of our prior decision is no basis for a panel to depart from our prior decision.” Id. “As we have stated, ‘[o]bedience to a Supreme Court decision is one thing, extrapolating from its implications a holding on an issue that was not before that Court in order to upend settled circuit law is another thing.” Id. In fact, the Supreme Court -- noting the ambiguities in the bankruptcy code and the “the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations” -- limited its Dewsnup decision expressly to the precise issue raised by the facts of the case. 112 S. Ct. at 778.

The Court reversed the District Court's opinion. Thus, at least in the 11th Circuit, a wholly unsecured lien may now be stripped in a Chapter 7 case.

New Georgia Homestead Exemption 2012

Published on June 9, 2012 by: Ian M. Falcone
In May 2012, Governor Deal signed legislation that increased the homestead exemption from $10,000 to $21,500 per person ($43,000 per married couple). While this is a welcome change, unfortunately the new legislation did not amend the amount of the wildcard exemption (which remains at a maximum of $5600).
Previously, debtors with more than $10,000 of equity in their homes ($20,000 per married couple) were often forced to file a Chapter 13 case simply to save their residence. The new law will allow Chapter 7 debtors an opportunity to protect more equity in their homes, and will improve the chances for meeting the (Means Test) qualifications for filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
While this change will probably not have any major impact during the current economic recession, it will likely have a substantial impact as home prices recover down the road.

About Homestead Exemptions in Georgia

Generally, a homeowner is entitled to a homestead exemption on their home and land underneath provided the home was owned by the homeowner and was their legal residence as of January 1 of the taxable year. (O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40)

Application for Homestead Exemption

To be granted a homestead exemption, a person must actually occupy the home, and the home is considered their legal residence for all purposes. Persons that are away from their home because of health reasons will not be denied homestead exemption. A family member or friend can notify the tax receiver or tax commissioner and the homestead exemption will be granted. (O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40)
Application for homestead exemption must be filed with the tax commissioner's office, or in some counties the tax assessor's office has been delegated to receive applications for homestead exemption.
A homeowner can file an application for homestead exemption for their home and land any time during the calendar year. To receive the homestead exemption for the current tax year, the homeowner must have owned the property on January 1 and filed the homestead application by the same date property tax returns are due in the county. Property tax returns are required to be filed by April 1. Homestead applications that are filed after this date will not be granted until the next calendar year. (O.C.G.A. § 48-5-45)

Failure to apply by the deadline will result in loss of the exemption for that year. (O.C.G.A. § 48-5-45) Click this link for more information on when homestead applications should be filed in the county.